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Abstract
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a
static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known
theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor
of replicator dynamics but not every attractor is an ESS. We search for
a dynamic characterization of ESSs in quantum games and find that in
certain asymmetric bi-matrix games evolutionary stability of attractors
can change as the game switches between its two forms, one classical and
the other quantum.
1 Introduction
Theory of quantum games [1, 2] has attracted significant attention during recent
years. One of the area where classical game theory [3] has been quite successful
is the evolutionary dynamics in a population. Evolutionary game theory [4] is
a growing area of research where the individuals of a population are treated as
players participating in a game. The players are not rational individuals and
their moves or strategies are inherited traits. In initial studies Maynard Smith
and Price [5] considered anonymous players who are randomly matched in pairs
to play a bi-matrix game. Allowing higher payoff strategies to gradually displace
strategies with lower payoffs introduces a dynamics in the population. Much of
the evolutionary game theory deals with the concept of an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), which is characterized by the condition that if all individuals
choose this strategy, then no other strategy can spread in a population.
Earlier we studied [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria
(NE) related to the quantization of classical games. We found that in certain
games evolutionary stability of NE can change as the game switches between its
classical and quantum forms. We considered evolutionary stability in a scheme
to play a quantum game proposed by Marinatto and Weber [11].
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Maynard Smith and Price [5] introduced the idea of an ESS essentially as a
static concept. Nothing in the definition of an ESS guarantees that the dynamics
of evolution in small mutational steps will necessarily converge the process of
evolution to an ESS. In fact directional evolution may also become responsible
for the establishment of strategies that are not evolutionarily stable [12].
What are the advantages involved in the dynamic approach [13] towards the-
ory of ESSs? Such an approach can be seen in the context of Liapunov’s classic
definition of stability of equilibria for general dynamical systems. This defini-
tion can also be adapted for the stability of a NE. A pair of strategies (p⋆, q⋆) is
Liapunov stable when for every trajectory starting somewhere in a small neigh-
borhood of radius ǫ > 0 around a point representing the pair (p⋆, q⋆) another
small neighborhood of radius δ > 0 can be defined such that the trajectory stays
in it. When every trajectory starting in a small neighborhood of radius σ > 0
around the point (p⋆, q⋆) converges to (p⋆, q⋆) the strategy pair (p⋆, q⋆) becomes
an attractor. Trajectories are defined by the dynamics underlying the game.
Taylor and Jonker [14] introduced a dynamics into evolutionary games with
the hypothesis that the growth rate of those playing each strategy is propor-
tional to the advantage of that strategy. This hypothesis is now understood as
one of many different forms of replicator dynamics [12, 15]. In simple words as-
sume that xi is the frequency (i.e. relative proportion) of the individuals using
strategy i and x, where xT = [x1, x2...xi...xn] and T is the transpose, is a vector
whose components are the frequencies with
n
Σ
i=1
xi = 1. Let Pi(x) be the average
payoff for using i when the population is in the state x. Let P¯ = ΣxjPj be the
average success in the population. The replicator equation is, then, written as
[16]
•
xi = xi(Pi(x) − P¯ ) (1)
where the dot is derivative w.r.t time. In case the payoff matrix is given as A =
(aij) with aij being the average payoff for strategy i when the other player uses
j. The average payoff for the strategy i in the population (with the assumption
of random encounters of the individuals) is (Ax)i = ai1x1 + ...+ ainxn and the
Eq. (1) becomes
•
xi = xi((Ax)i − x
TAx) (2)
The population state is then given as a point in n simplex△ [17]. The hypothesis
of Taylor and Jonker [14] gives a flow on △ whose flow lines represent the
evolution of the population. In evolutionary game theory it is agreed [4] that
every ESS is an attractor of the flow defined on △ by the replicator equation
(1), however, the converse does not hold: an attractor is not necessarily an ESS.
We now ask a question: is it possible that a non-ESS attractor of replicator
dynamics in a classical game becomes an ESS for some quantum form of the
same game. This possibility, besides strengthening our previous results about
the relationships between parameters of initial quantum state and evolutionary
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stability of a NE, gives a dynamic ground to the relevance of the theory of ESSs
in quantum games.
We main result in this paper is that the above possibility exists, indeed, in
certain types of games. Quantization, thus, can change non-ESS attractor of
replicator dynamics into an ESS or conversely.
2 Equilibria and attractors of replicator dynam-
ics
Early studies about the attractors of replicator dynamics by Schuster, Sigmund
and Wolff [18, 19] reported the dynamics of enzymatic actions of chemicals in a
mixture when their relative proportions could be changed. For example in the
case of a mixture of three chemicals added in a correct order, such that corre-
sponding initial conditions are in the basin of an interior attractor, it becomes
a stable cooperative mixture of all three chemicals. But if they are added in a
wrong order the initial conditions then lie in another basin and only one of the
chemicals survives with others two excluded. Eigen and Schuster [18, 19, 20]
also studied resulting dynamics in the evolution of macromolecules before the
advent of life.
Schuster and Sigmund [21] applied the dynamics to animal behavior in Battle
of Sexes game and described the evolution of strategies by treating it as a
dynamical system. They wrote replicator Eqs. (2) for the following general
bi-matrix
Male’s strategy
X1
X2
Female’s strategy
Y1 Y2[
(a11, b11) (a12, b12)
(a21, b21) (a22, b22)
]
(3)
where a male can play pure strategies X1, X2 and a female can play pure
strategies Y1, Y2 respectively. Let in a population engaged in this game the
frequencies of X1 and X2 are x1 and x2 respectively. Similarly the frequencies
of Y1 and Y2 are y1 and y2 respectively. Obviously
x1 + x2 = y1 + y2 = 1
where xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2 (4)
the replicator equations (2) for the matrix (3) with conditions (4) are, then,
written as
•
x = x(1− x) {y(a11 − a12 − a21 + a22) + (a12 − a22)}
•
y = y(1− y) {x(b11 − b12 − b21 + b22) + (b12 − b22)} (5)
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where x1 = x and y1 = y. These equations are of Lotka-Volterra type describing
the evolution of two populations consisting of predator and prey [22]. Schuster
and Sigmund [21] simplified the problem by taking
a11 = b11 = a22 = b22 = 0
a12 = a a21 = b and
b12 = c b21 = d (6)
which does not restrict the generality and the replicator Eqs. (5) remain similar.
Payoffs to the male PM (x, y) and to the female PF (x, y) when the male plays
X1 with probability x (i.e. he plays X2 with the probability (1 − x)) and the
female plays Y1 with the probability y (i.e. she plays Y2 with the probability
(1− y)) are written as [23]
PM (x, y) = x
TMy
PF (x, y) = x
TFy (7)
where M =
[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
, F =
[
b11 b12
b21 b22
]
and x =
[
x
1− x
]
, y =
[
y
1− y
]
and T is for transpose.
Suppose now a quantum form of the matrix game (3) is played using Mar-
inatto and Weber’s scheme [11]. The players have at their disposal following
initial quantum state
|ψini〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2
ci,j |ij〉 (8)
with normalization ∑
i,j=1,2
|cij |
2
= 1 (9)
where 1 corresponds to the pure strategies X1 or Y1 and 2 corresponds to the
pure strategies X2 or Y2. The constants cij for i, j = 1, 2 are complex numbers
in general. Players apply unitary operators on the quantum state with classical
probabilities and payoffs to them are decided later by a measurement on final
state [11]. Male and Female players apply the identity operator Iˆ on the initial
state |ψini〉 with the probabilities x and y respectively. Both the players also
apply the Pauli’s spin-flip operator σˆx with probabilities (1 − x) and (1 − y)
respectively. The operator σˆx changes the state |1〉 to |2〉 and |2〉 to |1〉. Payoffs
to both players are written [10] in a similar form as in the Eq. (7)
PM (x, y) = x
T
ωy
PF (x, y) = x
T
χy (10)
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ω and χ are quantum forms [10] of the payoff matrices M and F respectively
i.e.
ω =
[
ω11 ω12
ω21 ω22
]
and χ =
[
χ
11
χ
12
χ
21
χ
22
]
(11)
where
ω11 = a11 |c11|
2
+ a12 |c12|
2
+ a21 |c21|
2
+ a22 |c22|
2
ω12 = a11 |c12|
2
+ a12 |c11|
2
+ a21 |c22|
2
+ a22 |c21|
2
ω21 = a11 |c21|
2 + a12 |c22|
2 + a21 |c11|
2 + a22 |c12|
2
ω22 = a11 |c22|
2
+ a12 |c21|
2
+ a21 |c12|
2
+ a22 |c11|
2
(12)
similarly
χ
11
= b11 |c11|
2 + b12 |c12|
2 + b21 |c21|
2 + b22 |c22|
2
χ
12
= b11 |c12|
2
+ b12 |c11|
2
+ b21 |c22|
2
+ b22 |c21|
2
χ
21
= b11 |c21|
2
+ b12 |c22|
2
+ b21 |c11|
2
+ b22 |c12|
2
χ
22
= b11 |c22|
2
+ b12 |c21|
2
+ b21 |c12|
2
+ b22 |c11|
2
(13)
For the initial product state |ψini〉 = |11〉 the matrices ω and χ are same
as M and F respectively. The classical game is, therefore, embedded in the
quantum game. Simplified matrices ω and χ can be obtained by the assumption
of Eq. (6) i.e.
ω11 = a |c12|
2
+ b |c21|
2
, ω12 = a |c11|
2
+ b |c22|
2
ω21 = a |c22|
2
+ b |c11|
2
, ω22 = a |c21|
2
+ b |c12|
2
χ
11
= c |c12|
2
+ d |c21|
2
, χ
12
= c |c11|
2
+ d |c22|
2
χ
21
= c |c22|
2
+ d |c11|
2
, χ
22
= c |c21|
2
+ d |c12|
2
(14)
The replicator Eqs. (5) can now be written in the following ‘quantum’ form
•
x = x(1 − x)[aK1 + bK2 − (a+ b)(K1 +K2)y]
•
y = y(1− y)[cK1 + dK2 − (c+ d)(K1 +K2)x] (15)
where K1 = |c11|
2
− |c21|
2
and K2 = |c22|
2
− |c12|
2
. These equations reduce to
Eqs. (5) for |ψini〉 = |11〉 i.e. |c11|
2
= 1. Similar to classical version [21] the
dynamics (15) has five rest or equilibrium points x = 0, y = 0; x = 0, y =
1; x = 1, y = 0; x = 1, y = 1; and an interior equilibrium point
x =
cK1 + dK2
(c+ d)(K1 +K2)
, y =
aK1 + bK2
(a+ b)(K1 +K2)
(16)
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This equilibrium point is the same as in the classical game [21] for |ψini〉 = |11〉
i.e.
x =
c
c+ d
, y =
a
a+ b
(17)
We use the method of linear approximation [22] at equilibrium points to find
the general character of phase diagram of the system (15). Write the system
(15) as
•
x = X(x, y),
•
y = Y(x, y) (18)
The matrix for linearization [22] is[
Xx Xy
Yx Yy
]
(19)
where, for example,Xx denotes
∂X
∂x
. The matrix is evaluated at each equilibrium
point in turn. Writing these terms as
Xx = (1− 2x) {aK1 + bK2 − (a+ b)(K1 +K2)y}
Xy = −x(1− x)(a + b)(K1 +K2)
Yx = −y(1− y)(c+ d)(K1 +K2)
Yy = (1− 2y) {cK1 + dK2 − (c+ d)(K1 +K2)x} (20)
and the characteristic equation [22] at an equilibrium point is obtained from∣∣∣∣ (Xx − λ) XyYx (Yy − λ)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 (21)
The patterns of phase paths around equilibrium points classify the points into
a few principal cases. Suppose λ1, λ2 are roots of the characteristic Eq. (21). A
few cases are as follows:
(1). λ1, λ2 real, different, non-zero, and same sign. If λ1, λ2 > 0 then the
equilibrium point is an unstable node or a repellor. If λ1, λ2 < 0 the node is
stable or an attractor.
(2). λ1, λ2 real, different, non-zero, and opposite sign. The equilibrium
point is a saddle point.
(3). λ1 = λ2 = α+ iβ, β 6= 0 The equilibrium is a stable spiral (attractor)
if α < 0, an unstable spiral (repellor) if α > 0, a centre if α = 0.
Consider an equilibrium or rest point x = 1, y = 0 written simply as (1, 0).
At this point the characteristic Eq. (21) has these roots
λ1 = −aK1 − bK2, λ2 = −cK2 − dK1 (22)
For the classical game, i.e. |ψini〉 = |11〉, these roots are λ1 = −a, λ2 = −d.
Therefore in case a, d > 0 the equilibrium point (1, 0) is an attractor in the
classical game. Every ESS is also an attractor but the converse is not true. We
6
now write down the conditions that make the attractor (1, 0) also an ESS. The
game of the matrix (3) with simplifications given in Eq. (6) is an asymmetric
game and the equilibrium (1, 0) is an ESS if it is a strict NE [4]. The strict NE
conditions for the point (1, 0) are
PM (1, 0)− PM (x, 0) = (1− x){a(|c11|
2
− |c21|
2
) +
b(|c22|
2 − |c12|
2)} > 0
PF (1, 0)− PF (1, y) = y{c(|c11|
2
− |c12|
2
) +
d(|c22|
2
− |c21|
2
)} > 0 (23)
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x 6= 1 and y 6= 0. In classical game, therefore, (1, 0) is
an ESS when both a, c > 0. A comparison of the strict inequalities (23) with
the roots (22) of the characteristic Eq. (21) show that in case |c11|
2
= |c22|
2
the
inequalities (23) guarantee that both λ1 and λ2 are negative and consequently
an ESS is an attractor and an attractor is an ESS.
We study three cases:
(a). The equilibrium point (1, 0) is an attractor in classical as well as a
quantum form of the game. However it is not an ESS in the classical game but
is an ESS in the quantum game.
(b). Point (1, 0) is an attractor in classical as well as a quantum game.
However, it is an ESS in classical game but not an ESS in the quantum game.
(c). An interior point is a saddle (center) in the classical game but it becomes
a centre (saddle) in a quantum form of the game.
2.1 Case (a)
Let the constants a, b, c and d are such that a, d > 0 and b, c < 0. The equi-
librium point (1, 0) is, then, a non-ESS attractor in classical game. Select the
parameters of the initial state cij such that |c21|
2
< |c22|
2
< |c11|
2
< |c12|
2
with the normalization in Eq. (9). The equilibrium (1, 0) is now an ESS in the
quantum form of the game.
2.2 Case (b)
In case a, c, d > 0 and b < 0 the point (1, 0) is an ESS attractor of the classical
game. Select now the parameters cij of the initial quantum state such that
|c22|
2
< |c21|
2
< |c11|
2
< |c12|
2
and c(|c12|
2
− |c22|
2
) < d(|c11|
2
− |c21|
2
). The
equilibrium (1, 0) is a non-ESS attractor of the corresponding quantum game.
2.3 Case (c)
At the interior equilibrium point (x, y) of Eq. (16) the terms of the matrix of
linearization of Eq. (20) are
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Xx = 0, Yy = 0
Xy =
−(cK1 + dK2)(cK2 + dK1)(a+ b)
(c+ d)2(K1 +K2)
Yx =
−(aK1 + bK2)(aK2 + bK1)(c+ d)
(a+ b)2(K1 +K2)
(24)
the roots of the characteristic Eq. (21) are numbers ±λ where
λ =
√
(aK1 + bK2)(aK2 + bK1)(cK1 + dK2)(cK2 + dK1)
(a+ b)(c+ d)(K1 +K2)2
(25)
the term in square root can be a positive or negative real number. Therefore,
a saddle (center) in classical game can be a center (saddle) in certain quantum
form of the game. A saddle or a center in a classical (quantum) game can not
be, however, an attractor or a repellor in quantum (classical) form of the game.
3 Discussion
In classical evolutionary game theory attractors of a dynamics and ESSs are
usually studied with reference to population models. Extending these ideas to
quantum settings requires an assumption of a population of individuals having
access to quantum mechanical operators and entangled states. What is the
possible relevance of such an assumption in real world? Evolutionary quantum
computation (EQC) [24] is such an example. In EQC an ensemble of quantum
subsystems is considered changing continually such a way as to optimize some
measure of emergent patterns between the system and its environment. This
optimization can thought to be related to equilibria and even to some stability
property of the equilibria. Nature of quantum interaction deciding stability of
equilibria imply that optimization itself depends on it. Brain itself has been
proposed as an evolutionary quantum computer.
Has the ESS idea a relevance only in population models? For two players
case a meaning of ESS exists when the usual term ‘frequency’ is replaced with
‘fraction of the total time’. Two quantum interacting molecules modelled as
players in a game will involve considerations of evolutionary stability and how
it depends on the interaction pattern.
The scheme proposed by Marinatto and Weber [11] allows consideration
of the relationship between quantization and evolutionary stability in matrix
games. In classical ESS theory pure strategies can be combined with proba-
bilities that sum up to one. Similar things happen in this scheme to play a
quantum game. Nevertheless, the quantum aspect gives more ‘dimensions’ to a
classical matrix game and stability properties of NE, and also attractors, can be
studied by starting the game with different initial states. ESS idea is extended
to quantum games as a static concept [6] but we showed in this paper that it can
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also be dynamically characterized in such games. It then provides an alternative
way for studying dynamic quantum games.
An important aspect by which evolutionary game theory is different from
classical game theory is the role and need of rational decision makers [15]. Clas-
sical game theory was developed under the assumptions of rational decision mak-
ers. In evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, an individual’s ‘strategy’
is an inherited trait usually called a ‘phenotype’. A population is an abstract
entity of interacting individuals with genetically determined strategies. This
approach makes unnecessary the need for rational decision makers. In our effort
to extend the ideas of evolutionary game theory to quantum games no ratio-
nality is associated to decision makers whose actions are quantum mechanical.
Such decisions can be made, for example, in a group of interacting molecules
without an assumption of consciousness associated with them.
We believe quantum game theory can provide a role for quantum mechan-
ics in self organization of interacting molecules. Quantum mechanics is long
known to play role in keeping the atoms together in molecules. We believe that
quantum game theory paves the way for an equally important role for quantum
mechanics in evolution and development of self organization and complexity in
molecular systems. This aspect arises exciting new questions about quantum
role in origin of life and also in origin of consciousness.
The ESS idea in population biology was developed in an attempt to under-
stand complex behaviors in animal societies. The goal was to model evolutionary
processes in populations of interacting individuals and to explain why certain
states in the population are stable against perturbations induced by mutations.
We do not see why the ESSs, and also other concepts of dynamic stability of
equilibria, should be useless in the context of the rise of self organization in
groups of interacting molecules. Our results show that quantum mechanics has
strong and important roles in selection of stable solutions in a system of inter-
acting ‘entities’. These entities can do quantum actions on quantum states and
may simply consist of a collection of molecules. We believe that if stability of
solutions or equilibria can be affected by quantum interactions then it provides
a new approach towards theories of rise of complexity in groups of quantum
interacting entities.
Out of two perspectives, on what should be an outcome of evolution, the
matrix game theory provides one and the other is provided by optimization
models [25]. In optimization models the selection is frequency-independent and
evolution is imagined as a hill-climbing process. Optimal solution is obtained
where fitness is maximized. Evolutionary optimization is the basis of evolu-
tionary and genetic algorithms and forms a different approach than ESSs in
matrix games. These are not, however, in direct contradiction and give dif-
ferent outlooks on evolutionary process. We believe evolutionary optimization
is another area where a role for quantum mechanics exists and quantum game
theory provides hints to find it.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, using Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [11] to play a quantum
game, we explored how quantization of matrix games can give or take away evo-
lutionary stability to attractors of replicator dynamics when it is the underlying
process of the game. We considered the effects of quantization on a saddle or a
center of the dynamics. We found quantization can be responsible for changing
the evolutionary stability of an attractor of the dynamics. These results give
a dynamic characterization to our previous results which treated the ESS idea
as a static concept. We suggest these results can be of interest in evolution-
ary quantum computing and also in evolutionary optimization, both of which
involve quantum interactions between ‘entities’ constituting a population.
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